Shut name for this skier on East Groundhog Peak, also called Captain’s Chair, in Alaska’s Kenai Mountains who triggered an avalanche and ended up in an uncontrolled headfirst 1,200 vertical toes descent.
The skier sustained critical accidents within the slide and emergency medical companies have been referred to as for a rescue. An Air Nationwide Guard helicopter arrived on scene 5 hours later and the person was taken to the hospital the place he’s recovering from his accidents.
Learn the complete accident report from Chugach Nationwide Forest Avalanche Data Middle beneath:
Chugach Nationwide Forest Avalanche Data Middle Accident Report:
Date: Fri, January thirty first, 2025
Abstract: One skier caught, carried, and injured.
East Groundhog Peak – Accident Report
Additionally known as Captain’s Chair, Kenai Mountains, Alaska
Location: East Groundhog Peak
Lat/Lon: 60.680667 N, -149.275246 W
Date: January 31, 2025 time: 13:30
Report by: Chugach Nationwide Forest Avalanche Middle (CNFAC)
Contact: employees@chugachavalanche.org, web site: ChugachAvalanche.org
Avalanche Abstract
A skier triggered an avalanche on East Groundhog Peak (also called Captain’s Chair) on Friday afternoon. The skier was the second set of tracks on slope. The skier was caught and carried roughly 1200 vertical toes, sustaining critical accidents. A second get together using within the space helped provoke and keep communications with emergency medical companies whereas the remainder of the members from the skier’s get together offered medical care. The skier was evacuated by helicopter at roughly 18:45.
Avalanche Data
Kind: Gentle Slab
Downside/Character: Wind Slab
Crown Depth: 12-60”
Width: 100’
Vertical Run: 1200’
Set off: Skier
Side: West-Northwest
Elevation: 4000’ at crown, 2800′ at runout
Slope Angle: 40 levels
Slope Traits: Planar slope, beneath convex roll, sparse bushes, alders, tundra in begin zone.
Code: SS-ASu-R1-D2-I
Backcountry Avalanche Forecast
The CNFAC rated the avalanche hazard at MODERATE above treeline, with wind slab avalanches as the first concern. The forecast talked about ‘Wind slabs are anticipated to be round 1′ deep and positioned alongside ridgelines and convex options at higher elevations. We count on them to be cussed for an individual to set off however nonetheless doable in steeper terrain’
Climate and Snowpack Abstract
The Lynx Creek drainage is accessed from the Johnson Move trailhead, and is sort of totally motorized entry within the winter. This space had very lately been opened to motorized use. In consequence, there was nearly no snowpack info for this particular space previous to the incident. For the Turnagain Move space usually, the CNFAC had been monitoring a layer of weak snow that was buried throughout a significant storm occasion within the first week of January. With an exceptionally moist January, the layer had been buried by 16.8″ Snow Water Equal (SWE) on the close by Middle Ridge Snotel web site throughout the weeks main as much as the occasion. The layer had not produced any main avalanche exercise within the Turnagain Move zone regardless of a number of storm techniques contributing 2-3″ SWE over 48 hours or much less, and in consequence the CNFAC had dropped the layer as a priority for Turnagain Move. There have been no different identified issues inside the snowpack, however because the Johnson Move space had nearly no info, it was talked about particularly within the forecast as a probably problematic zone:
“In areas with a thinner snowpack, comparable to close to Crow Creek in Girdwood or on the southern finish of Turnagain Move close to Johnson Move Trailhead buried weak layers might exist within the snowpack. So we suggest taking a while to judge the snowpack earlier than committing to steep terrain.”
A significant storm impacted Southcentral Alaska Jan. 24-26, bringing 2.4″ SWE to Turnagain Move. This equalled roughly 2′ snow at higher elevations over that weekend, and prompted an Avalanche Warning for January 25-26. Temperatures plummeted following the storm, together with robust northwesterly winds, averaging 15 to twenty mph within the Turnagain Move space. Winds have been starting to subside within the common space on the day of the occasion, however members of the group concerned within the accident talked about observing sustained winds alongside the ridgetop instantly previous to the avalanche. It’s extremely unlikely that the avalanche on this accident report concerned something greater than windblown snow on a brand new/previous snow interface from the week main as much as the occasion.
Accident Abstract
There have been two events within the East Groundhog space on the time of the accident. The get together that the injured skier was touring with can be known as ‘Occasion 1’ and the second group can be known as ‘Occasion 2’. There have been six members in Occasion 1 and two members in Occasion 2.
4 members of Occasion 1 gained the ridgeline through snowmachine whereas two members watched from beneath. The 4 members on the ridge divided into two teams to descend, with Skiers 1 and a pair of and Snowboarder 1 on prime of 1 terrain function, and Snowboarder 2 on prime of an adjoining function. Skier 3 and Snowboarder 3 had a transparent view of the remainder of the group from beneath. Snowboarder 1 descended first with out incident, and was adopted instantly after by Skier 1. Skier 1 skied intently to the earlier set of tracks. Skier 1 had descended roughly 200 vertical toes earlier than triggering an avalanche about 20 toes to the appropriate of the primary set of tracks. The skier’s skis launched nearly instantly and the skier was carried within the transferring slab. The skier was capable of gradual himself simply sufficient to let many of the particles fall beneath him, however was carried for the size of the trail, together with by a rocky part simply above the apron. Snowboarder 1 was capable of arrest Skier 1 as he slid down the apron on the backside of the trail.
Rescue Abstract
Snowboarder 2 walked again to a snowmachine that was parked on the ridge and descended alongside the monitor the group had used to ascend. He picked up Snowboarder 3 on the backside and reached Skier 1 roughly 4 minutes after the avalanche. Snowboarder 2 instantly started administering backcountry medical care. Skier 2 started descend the identical earlier ascent route, the place Skier 3 picked him up alongside the best way. The 2 reached Skier 1 roughly 10 minutes after the avalanche.
Occasion 1 established contact with Occasion 2 instantly after the avalanche. When it turned clear that Skier 1 would wish a helicopter evacuation, Rider 1 from Occasion 2 rode as much as the ridge to get cellphone service and provoke emergency medical companies. This cellphone name was made roughly 20 minutes after the avalanche, at roughly 13:50. Rider 1 stayed in cell service to take care of contact with the Alaska State Troopers, and likewise maintained radio communication with Occasion 1. Rider 1 clearly said that it was not doable to securely land a helicopter within the complicated terrain the place Skier 1 had come to a relaxation, and the rescue would require a hoist.
A helicopter from a personal emergency air medical transport supplier flew over the scene at roughly 15:45, circling the scene twice earlier than confirming they have been unable to land and exiting the realm. The Air Nationwide Guard arrived on scene at roughly 18:15 and had the affected person loaded by hoist and evacuated by roughly 18:45.
